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Reliable estimates of indirect economic losses arising from natural disasters are currently out of
scientific reach. To address this problem, we propose a novel approach that combines a probabilistic
physical damage catastrophe model with a new generation of macroeconomic agent-based models
(ABMs). The ABM moves beyond the state of the art by exploiting large data sets from detailed
national accounts, census data, and business information, etc., to simulate interactions of millions
of agents representing each natural person or legal entity in a national economy. The catastrophe
model introduces a copula approach to assess flood losses, considering spatial dependencies of the
flood hazard. These loss estimates are used in a damage scenario generator that provides input for
the ABM, which then estimates indirect economic losses due to the event. For the first time, we are
able to link environmental and economic processes in a computer simulation at this level of detail.
We show that moderate disasters induce comparably small but positive short- to medium-term, and
negative long-term economic impacts. Large-scale events, however, trigger a pronounced negative
economic response immediately after the event and in the long term, while exhibiting a temporary
short- to medium-term economic boost. We identify winners and losers in different economic sectors,
including the fiscal consequences for the government. We quantify the critical disaster size beyond
which the resilience of an economy to rebuild reaches its limits. Our results might be relevant for
the management of the consequences of systemic events due to climate change and other disasters.
Keywords: resilience | large-scale data-driven modeling | economic simulator | natural hazard modeling |
environmental-economic coupling |
I. INTRODUCTION
Total economic losses from natural and man-made dis-
asters in 2017 are estimated to be USD 306 billion.1 With
hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria, which have made
2017 the second costliest hurricane season on record, the
US was hit particularly hard. Due to climate change,
economic losses from extreme events – such as floods,
droughts, and other climatic disasters – will further in-
crease, and events that have been considered rare until
now will become more common in the future [1]. How-
ever, the resulting economic losses to a national econ-
omy are difficult to quantify. While direct losses due to
the immediate destruction of homes, firms, infrastruc-
tures and lives can be reliably estimated with existing
data, estimates of indirect losses – which arise as eco-
nomic consequences of physical destruction – are much
harder to obtain, and no consensus on their validity exists
[2]. The primary reason for this is that natural disasters
affect the economy in multiple ways and along several
1 http://www.swissre.com/media/news_releases/nr20171220_
sigma_estimates.html
dimensions [3, 4]. For example, a flood event might de-
stroy or damage the physical capital of a firm, causing
output losses and worker layoffs. This, in turn, can trig-
ger further output losses to suppliers and customers of
that firm, potentially leading to more layoffs. The asso-
ciated reduction in household income additionally lowers
consumption, potentially further enhancing output losses
and increasing layoffs. Subsequently, however, the recon-
struction of damaged or destroyed capital can have the
opposite effect: companies involved in reconstruction ac-
tivities experience growth and expand their workforce,
which results in higher income that ripples through the
economy and leads to economic growth via Keynesian
multiplier effects. Hence, natural disasters simultane-
ously cause both indirect losses and indirect gains. We
refer to these losses and gains as indirect economic ef-
fects.2
2 To avoid double counting, we measure losses or gains as the
change in gross domestic product (GDP) relative to a baseline
scenario. This definition differs from [5], who additionally at-
tributes employment losses (e.g. due to the closure of damaged
facilities) to direct losses, and defines indirect losses as all eco-
nomic consequences except for damages (direct losses) and em-
ployment losses caused by the disaster.
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2Indirect economic effects of average natural disasters,
as measured by changes in GDP, are typically small. Net
effects may even be close to zero in the short term, where
losses and gains of natural disasters can cancel each other
out [6]. Still, there are winners and losers, since effects
may differ substantially across industries and economic
sectors, and almost never cancel for companies and indi-
viduals [7]. Several empirical studies even find small but
positive short- to medium-term overall effects for moder-
ate natural disasters of certain types, especially for mod-
erate floods [7–14]. However, the evidence on the sign
and magnitude of indirect economic effects of natural
disasters in general remains mixed and conflicting, see
[11–13] for recent surveys. This situation is echoed in
meta-analyses such as [15], which reports that disasters
on average have an insignificant impact in terms of in-
direct costs, and [16], which finds some evidence that a
part of the negative impact of natural disasters reported
in studies is caused by a publication bias. Moreover,
[17] shows that the impacts of natural disasters on differ-
ent components of GDP (such as investment, government
and private consumption, exports, imports) differ widely
in timing, direction and extent. More aggregate analy-
ses might mask these differences, and it may be difficult
to find clear and large net aggregate impacts on GDP.
Severe natural disasters (systemic events), on the other
hand, are not believed to have neutral or positive eco-
nomic effects on an aggregate level [7–9, 12, 18, 19]. In-
direct economic losses from these systemic events may be
amplified by several mechanisms such as post-disaster in-
flation, network effects like supply chains affecting firms
that were not initially impacted by the event, as well
as physical and financial resource constraints regarding
the productive capacity of the economy [3]. Despite
these general arguments, empirical evidence on indirect
economic effects of systemic events, particularly regard-
ing severe floods in developed economies, is scarce and
largely inconclusive [7–10, 20, 21].
Indirect economic effects from natural disasters are dif-
ficult to model with traditional approaches such as input-
output (IO) models [22–28], computable general equilib-
rium (CGE) models [29–34], and econometric analyses
[7–19, 35] because of the over-simplifying nature of these
approaches [36]. IO models have a tendency to overes-
timate indirect economic losses and gains [2]. This was
demonstrated, for example, for the case of job gains from
reconstruction following the Northridge earthquake in
California in 1994: [37] showed that the IO estimates by
[38] significantly exceeded actual data for the Los Angeles
area following the earthquake [2]. Furthermore, IO mod-
els cannot incorporate the reactions of economic agents to
a disaster. By design, CGE models are overly optimistic
regarding the flexibility of an economy to react to natural
disasters [3]. This is due to the underlying assumption
that price clearing mechanisms bring the economy back
to a general equilibrium after a certain time and are sub-
ject only to modest constraints such as adjustment costs
in the investment function. However, real-world price
formation is sticky and imperfect. Production functions
typically assumed in CGE models3 often overstate the
flexibility of substitution between factors of production
(labor, capital, material input). Econometric analysis of
indirect economic effects faces the problem that statis-
tical, historical relationships used to derive model pa-
rameters are likely to be disrupted by the disaster [2].
The latter study points out an array of factors that may
challenge the implicit socio-economic assumptions of the
approach, including: the temporary nature of measures
taken directly after the disaster event, permanent eco-
nomic changes (e.g. in the production function), pur-
chase and sale patterns, as well as labor force migration
or overtime hours in the reconstruction phase. Indicative
of this, [6] demonstrates that the regional econometric
model results in [39] over-estimated the economic impact
of Hurricane Andrew, which hit the US in 1992, by 70-85
% [2].
In summary, traditional approaches so far have failed
to provide unambiguous conclusions about the indirect
economic effects of natural disasters, in particular re-
garding systemic events. This means that, given the
characteristics of these traditional approaches, today it
is still largely impossible to relate the size of initial dam-
ages of natural disasters to the expected subsequent indi-
rect economic effects, or to clearly disentangle expected
losses and growth effects on a sectoral level. To address
this problem, we propose a novel approach that combines
a probabilistic physical damage catastrophe model with
a new generation of macroeconomic agent-based models
(ABMs). The ABM we adopt moves beyond the state
of the art by exploiting large data sets from detailed na-
tional accounts, census data, and business information,
etc., to simulate the interactions of millions of agents rep-
resenting each natural person or legal entity, such as cor-
porations, government entities and institutions in a na-
tional economy. It has been shown that this model is able
to forecast numerous macroeconomic variables including
major variables such as GDP, inflation, consumption and
investment better than standard forecasting approaches
[40].
We apply our method to estimate indirect economic
losses from flood events in Austria, for which the men-
tioned data is available in highly detailed, complete and
consistent form (see SI4). The ABM is geolocalized in the
sense that the location of capital stock, e.g. firms and
infrastructure, is known. The geospatial distribution of
capital across Austria is shown in Fig. 1. The physi-
cal damage catastrophe model (damage scenario genera-
tor) allows us to generate realistic virtual natural disaster
events (floods) of controlled size. It is based on a copula
approach that assesses realistic hazard frequency and in-
tensity, and takes into account spatial dependencies and
3 Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions.
4 http://www.complex-systems.meduniwien.ac.at/people/
spoledna/supporting_information_poledna_et_al_2018.pdf
3FIG. 1. Geospatial distribution of capital across Austria. Af-
fected capital in flooding zones of a 250-year event is shown
in a color scale from green to red, where green indicates small
damages and red large damages up to 10 bln. Euro. Gray
indicates capital stock not affected by the flood. For exam-
ple, capital stock in Vienna (the large bar in the northeast) is
not affected due to extensive flood protection measures, and
is therefore shown as grayed out.
the dependency on the severity of the events (see SI). Af-
ter generating a geolocalized flood event of a given size
at the beginning of year 2014,5 the affected dwellings,
firms and infrastructure are destroyed (the affected cap-
ital in flooding zones of a 250-year event is depicted in
Fig. 1). On this basis, the detailed indirect economic
effects across economic sectors and industries are studied
in the ABM over several consecutive years.
RESULTS
Moderate disasters do not always have a negative
impact on economic growth
Fig. 2 shows the indirect economic effects resulting
from a 100-year (blue line) and a 250-year (red line) flood
event that destroys dwellings and productive capital.6
The total direct losses (damages) amount to about 0.6
% (100-year event) and 1.2 % (250-year event) of Aus-
trian capital stock, respectively. Fig. 2(a) shows the cu-
mulative change in the GDP growth rate relative to the
baseline scenario7 in percentage points (pp).8 The qual-
5 This year is chosen to simulate the flooding event since 2013 it
is the last year for which the main data source – the symmetric
IO tables for the Austrian economy – is available to calibrate the
model.
6 The event occurs at the beginning of the year 2014.
7 The baseline scenario describes a continuation of current trends
for the Austrian economy. The baseline scenario serves as the
benchmark against which we evaluate the indirect economic ef-
fects of the different flooding scenarios.
8 A percentage point (pp) is the unit for the arithmetic difference
of two percentages. For example, moving up from 10% to 12% is
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FIG. 2. Indirect economic gains and losses of a 100- (blue),
250- (red) and 1,500- (black) year flood event. Time labels on
the x-axis indicate the end of each year, and the gray verti-
cal bar marks the first year after the flood. The panels show
the effects as percentage point changes relative to the base-
line scenario, in which no disaster happens. (a) Cumulative
changes in GDP-growth rates. (b) Cumulative changes in the
unemployment rate. (c) Changes in the government debt-to-
GDP ratio. Shaded areas cover one standard deviation above
and below the mean values, as obtained from 50 independent
Monte-Carlo simulations.
4itative behavior of the two scenarios is similar: starting
from small negative effects immediately after the disaster,
cumulative effects on economic growth then become pos-
itive in the short to medium term (2014-2018), and turn
negative in the long term. These effects are most pro-
nounced with an about 0.5 pp cumulative GDP growth
rate increase (250-year event) relative to the baseline sce-
nario in the second year after the flood (2015). In the long
term, primarily due to a multiplier-accelerator mecha-
nism [41] (see below), the effects decline to an almost
neutral impact (100-year event), and to a reduction of
GDP growth of approx. 0.8 pp (250-year event), respec-
tively. This behavior, i.e. positive short- to medium-term
and negative long-term effects of moderate size, is in line
with the literature [7, 8, 10, 14, 35]. Fig. 2(b) demon-
strates that – as to be expected according to Okun’s law
– the change in the unemployment rate is inversely cor-
related to economic growth, but at a slightly lower am-
plitude: for the 250-year event, a cumulative decline of
almost 0.5 pp two years after the flood (2015) is followed
by a cumulative growth in the unemployment rate up to a
maximum of about 0.5 pp in the long term. Fig. 2(c) de-
picts the government debt-to-GDP ratio and shows that
the dynamics of the growth and unemployment rates, as
well as the transfer we assume to be provided by the gov-
ernment to fully compensate households for their losses
of dwellings as catastrophe relief, all lead to an initial
rise in this ratio of about 2 pp. For three years after
the flood (2015-2018), the government debt-to-GDP ra-
tio temporarily falls slightly below its initial level, but in
the long run stabilizes at an increase by more than 2 pp
relative to the baseline scenario (250-year event).
Severe disasters have pronouncedly negative
economic effects immediately after the event and in
the long term
A severe-disaster scenario that simulates a 1500-year
flood event is shown in Fig. 2 (black lines). The to-
tal direct losses correspond to approximately 10 % of
the capital stock in Austria. The indirect economic ef-
fects after this shock are qualitatively different from the
moderate-disaster scenarios. The initial overall effect on
GDP growth is pronouncedly negative, with a cumula-
tive reduction of GDP growth by about 5 pp, see Fig.
2(a). Due to reconstruction, growth picks up fast in the
year after the disaster, and surpasses cumulative GDP
growth of the baseline scenario by the second year after
the flood (2015), culminating in a temporary economic
boost of about 2 pp of additional cumulative GDP growth
in 2016. The multiplier-accelerator mechanism [41], as
well as production, capacity and credit constraints (see
SI) drag growth downwards after this point, leading to
a 2 pp increase, but it is a 20 percent increase in what is being
measured.
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FIG. 3. Cumulative growth effects on sectoral GDP after
a 250-year flood event for selected economic sectors in per-
centage points (pp) relative to the baseline scenario. Shaded
areas cover one standard deviation above and below the mean
values. Sectors shown: construction sector (black), manufac-
turing sector (red) and real estate sector (blue). The gray
vertical bar indicates the year of the flood.
negative long-term cumulative growth effects of approx.
1.7 pp. The unemployment rate reacts strongly to the se-
vere disaster, with a cumulative initial increase of more
than 1.5 pp, and is followed by a reduction up to al-
most 2 pp in 2015 during the reconstruction phase, see
Fig. 2(b). After this pronounced disruption of the labor
market, the unemployment rate rises again by a cumula-
tive change of approx. 0.5 pp (2020) due to the cyclical
dynamics, and stabilizes at a level close to the baseline
scenario in the long term. Immediately after the disas-
ter, a large initial government transfer to households to
compensate for their losses of housing stock,9 as well as
substantial decreases in government revenues and GDP,
lead to a 10 pp rise of the government debt-to-GDP ra-
tio, see Fig. 2(c). Even though this ratio shortly returns
to its initial level due to the positive economic effects of
reconstruction, the downturn because of over-production
three years after the flood event implies a subsequent rise
in this ratio by almost 10 pp, leaving government finances
substantially deteriorated in the long term.
9 We assume – in line with past experiences of political processes
regarding catastrophe relief by the Austrian government – this
transfer to be limited to about a third of the total losses in
dwelling stock.
5Effects differ substantially across industries and
economic sectors
While moderate flood events can have positive aggre-
gate effects in the medium term, impacts are expected
to differ significantly across economic sectors. Fig. 3
confirms this conjecture. It shows the effects for the
most severely impacted sectors as a result of the 250-year
event. The real estate sector (blue line) suffers substan-
tially from the destruction of residential capital stock:
sectoral output is reduced by more than 4 pp. Despite
reconstruction works improving the initial situation, the
cumulative growth change in this sector remains nega-
tive, with a cumulative loss in growth of about 2 pp in
the long run. The construction sector (black line) imme-
diately profits from the reconstruction of dwellings and
productive capital with a sectoral GDP growth of almost
6 pp in the first year after the flood (2014). After the
fast ramp-up of reconstruction during the first years af-
ter the flood, peaking in an about 6.5 pp increase in the
second year after the flood (2015), this effect gradually
wears off in the following years, turns slightly negative by
year seven after the flood (2020) and remains rather sta-
ble at this level thereafter. The restoration of productive
capital takes more time. The largest cumulative increase
for the manufacturing industry (red line) of about 1 pp
is reached in year two after the flood (2015), since this
sector supplies a major part of the material input for
the re-installment of losses in productive capital. Follow-
ing the general downturn due to over-production and the
thereby induced economic cycle, we see that cumulative
GDP growth of this sector in the long term (2019-2023)
is lower by almost 1 pp than in the baseline scenario. The
effects on all sectors can be found in Table S7 in the SI.
Loss of resilience – when disasters become systemic
events
Fig. 4 shows the cumulative changes in GDP growth
(relative to the baseline scenario) as a function of the
sizes of direct damages of the event for different times
after the disaster: one year (2014), two years (2015), and
three years (2016) after the flood event. As can be ex-
pected, the larger the direct damage, the larger the de-
cline of GDP growth immediately after the flooding dis-
aster (2014) is. In the second year after the flood event
(2015), the effects of increased economic activity induce
positive overall GDP growth. Within this second year,
a large part of the initial damage can already by com-
pensated, i.e. cumulative growth effects in the second
year are slightly positive, but remain below 1 % for dis-
asters smaller than a 250-year event. For larger events,
the economy shows a remarkable growth that is induced
by reconstruction after the disaster, which clearly out-
weighs the direct losses. This growth is limited by dif-
ferent constraining factors (see SI) and starts to decline
with respect to the direct losses inflicted by the disas-
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FIG. 4. Cumulative changes in GDP growth relative to the
baseline scenario as a function of the direct damage as a per-
centage of GDP. Results are shown for three different years
after the disaster: 2014, 2015 and 2016. Shaded areas cover
one standard deviation above and below the mean values.
Immediately after the event (2014), all disaster sizes are asso-
ciated with negative growth relative to the baseline scenario.
In contrast, for the years 2015 and 2016 there exist inflection
points and maxima for GDP growth, indicating the existence
of direct damage sizes that, respectively, are “optimal” in
terms of economic growth and determine a threshold where
natural disasters become systemic events.
ter: the inflection point of the curve occurs at about a
2.4 % loss of capital stock. The cumulative changes in
GDP growth in this year show a maximum in the re-
gion where the initial damage causes about 3-4 % direct
losses in the capital stock. At this maximum, the growth
effects lose momentum and indirect losses start to dom-
inate beyond the maximum. The situation is similar for
two years after the event (black line): while the posi-
tion of the inflection point remains at about 2.4 %, the
growth stimulus is somewhat more pronounced, and the
maximum is located at approximately 5 % direct losses.
At this point economic growth is severely restrained, the
ability for resilience is lost, and the natural disaster be-
comes a systemic event.
DISCUSSION
We present a novel approach for estimating the indirect
economic losses caused by natural disasters by combining
a probabilistic physical damage catastrophe model with
a macroeconomic ABM. The method has been applied
to flood scenarios in Austria. The ABM is calibrated
to the Austrian economy (households, non-financial and
financial firms and a government sector) at a scale of
1:1, i.e. every economic agent in Austria (about 10 mil-
6lion) is represented in the model. The ABM incorpo-
rates an input-output model with 64 industries, where
all goods and services are produced endogenously, and
depicts the relevant constraints regarding productive ca-
pacities and financing conditions at the level of individual
agents. This allows us to estimate the indirect economic
effects of natural disasters that are caused by the un-
folding sequence of economic events following the initial
destruction of productive capital and dwellings. In par-
ticular, the model shows the indirect economic effects of
simulated disaster shocks of controlled size on the Aus-
trian economy in terms of cumulative GDP growth and
other major macroeconomic variables
The model produces realistic results in a number of
aspects. Specifically, results correspond well with recent
empirical findings of studies including sectoral detail and
different types of disasters such as [7, 8, 10, 14, 18, 35].
We find that moderate losses due to 100- and 250-year
flood events have small but positive short- to medium-
term impacts, while they lead to negative long-term ef-
fects of similar magnitude. These results correspond par-
ticularly well with [10], which shows that floods of mod-
erate magnitude in developed economies, while resulting
in positive short- to medium-term effects, have slightly
negative cumulative effects in the long run. Short- to
medium-term results are further supported by a firm-
level empirical study on flooding disasters in Europe [14],
which finds higher average firm asset and employment
growth for regions affected by flooding disasters. Com-
parable impacts are also obtained by [7, 8], which report
aggregate short- to medium-term positive growth effects
of floods, and by [18], which shows that natural disas-
ters have positive short-term growth effects in developed
economies. Negative long-term effects for climatic disas-
ters are also reported in [35].
Our study is the first to estimate the indirect economic
impacts of severe floods in a developed economy on an
empirical basis, at the same time taking account of com-
plex economic interactions and dynamics with our mod-
eling approach. Simulations of severe disasters, such as a
1,500-year flood event in Austria, induce a pronouncedly
more negative long-term economic impact on the Aus-
trian economy. These results, in line with a theoreti-
cal analysis conducted by [42], demonstrate that nega-
tive indirect effects from severe disasters are primarily
due to constraints on the productive capacity of the ex-
isting capital stock, credit provision and government fi-
nances, which impede immediate reconstruction and thus
impose a ceiling on positive growth effects. Empirical
findings regarding severe floods are largely inconclusive:
[7–10, 20, 21] all report no, insignificant or (once con-
trolled for) vanishing effects for systemic floods in par-
ticular. Especially regarding the most detailed study on
flooding disasters [10], a lack of data on severe floods in
developed countries seemed not to have permitted the
obtaining of results for this country group.
A unique feature of this analysis is that disaster im-
pacts are disaggregated across 64 industry sectors and si-
multaneously tracked over time, demonstrating how pos-
itive aggregate economic consequences may result in win-
ners and losers subject to particular dynamics. The sec-
toral decomposition of results reveals that, while some
sectors providing the means for the reconstruction of cap-
ital stock might profit (predominantly the construction
sector, to a lesser extent the manufacturing sector), oth-
ers that are particularly hit by the disaster suffer from
large losses that take several years to be compensated
(especially the real estate sector). We compute the dis-
tribution of losses and their dynamics over time across
sectors at a higher level of detail than previous stud-
ies. Models featuring endogenous dynamics such as CGE
models, even though they depict up to 35 industry sectors
as in [30], typically are comparative static CGE models10
[30–32], while fully dynamic CGE models usually depict
only one output good as in [29]. Furthermore, they often
are confined to regions smaller than a national economy
[31, 32]. Sectoral empirical studies such as [7, 8, 10] – be-
sides being limited methodologically as set forth above –
typically divide the economy into two to three aggregate
sectors (agriculture, industry and/or service sector). IO
models applied to comparable contexts, such as [23], usu-
ally exploit the full range of national IO tables (mostly
around 60-70 industries), but lack the endogenous non-
linear dynamics present in the ABM.
We show that disasters trigger cyclical economic re-
sponses that follow a classic multiplier-accelerator mech-
anism as described in [43]. The cycle is caused by an over-
shooting of investment during the reconstruction phase
leading to an economic boom, which is followed by a
downturn due to a lack of demand once the restora-
tion of capital stock has been completed. As reported
in [7, 8, 10], indirect economic effects immediately af-
ter the event are predominantly negative due to initial
losses of capital stock, income, as well as demand and
supply of goods. The positive economic stimulus due to
reconstruction occurs with a delay of at least a quar-
ter, because some time is necessary to compensate for
lost capital stock and income. This impulse in turn trig-
gers an economic cycle. In the long term, the conse-
quences of this cycle tend to outweigh the positive eco-
nomic impact induced by reconstruction activities. Such
a cyclical mechanism – which is different from Schum-
peter’s creative-destruction or productivity effect, which
has been the focus of several studies11 – has received little
10 I.e. they compare an initial equilibrium state before the disaster
and another equilibrium state after the disaster without consid-
eration of the dynamics between these two economic equilibria.
11 We do not consider this productivity effect in the present study,
since its empirical relevance is unclear and subject to extensive
debate in the literature, where different empirical studies present
mixed evidence on growth effects and associated increases in cap-
ital productivity after a natural disaster. For further discussion
on the productivity effect see [3], for empirical studies presenting
positive growth effects attributed to the productivity effect see
[44] and [45], whose findings are contradicted by several other
empirical studies, see [19, 20, 35, 46, 47].
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FIG. 5. Schematic overview of the ABM structure showing
the institutional sectors (households, non-financial and finan-
cial firms and a general government), and their interactions.
The stacked bars show an example of the distributions of di-
rect (left) and indirect (right) total losses to the government
(white), firms (red), and households (blue).
attention in the literature up to now, with the exception
of a theoretical analysis in [48].
This study is the first to combine a probabilistic phys-
ical damage catastrophe model with a macroeconomic
ABM to quantitatively relate disaster sizes with the indi-
rect economic impacts. We find a non-trivial behavior of
the cumulative GDP growth effects as a function of the
direct damage size. We determine a threshold beyond
which the full productive capacity of an economy has
been exploited to restore destroyed capital stock. At this
point, which is at around 5 % of destroyed capital stock,
resilience is lost, and economic growth is dominated by
direct losses. Previous studies such as [42] have hith-
erto investigated this matter on a theoretical and more
aggregate basis only.
We believe that in times of increased frequency and
severity of potential climate-change-related natural disas-
ters, it is expedient to anticipate their short- to long-term
economic implications, direct as well as indirect ones. In
particular, it is important to identify potential economic
losers of these events, so as to optimally prepare for a
fair and efficient post-crisis management.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Agent based model of a small economy
We employ an ABM – developed in [40] and [49] –
which depicts the economy of a small nation at a 1:1
scale (about 10 million agents) (see SI for a model de-
scription). The model is based on detailed data sources
from national accounts, input-output tables, government
statistics, census data and business surveys, and is able
to closely approximate time series of major macroeco-
nomic variables (GDP, inflation, household consumption,
investment). The basic structure of the model is depicted
in Fig. 5. The model is calibrated to the economy of
Austria in the year 2013, for which the required data is
available (see SI). Large economies are still out of scope
for such simulations within reasonable computing time.
Simulations were carried out on the supercomputer of the
Vienna Scientific Cluster.
Flood risk estimation and damage scenario generator
We estimate the disaster risk distributions for flood
losses in Austria using a copula approach, and build
a damage-scenario generator based on spatially explicit
data to simulate losses to individual households, non-
financial and financial firms and government entities
across the 64 economic sectors represented in the ABM.
The damage-scenario generator simulates a shock to indi-
vidual agents in the ABM, which subsequently alter their
behavior and create higher-order indirect effects over a
given time period (see SI).
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